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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
WAYNE M. PARKER

and DAVID A. JOHNS,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.

TELEGIFT INTERNATIONAL INC.,
a Utah corporation,

Case No.
12941

Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEl\IENT OJ;' KIND OF CASE
This is an action by the plaintiffs against the def encl ant for wages earn eel over a period beginning February 28, 1!)70, ancl ending November 18, 1970. Plaintiffs also claimed attorney fees, court costs and interest.

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
The Trial Court, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin presiding, found that the plaintiff \Vayne M.
Parker was employed by Telegift Incorporated (herei11after sometiuies designated "Telegift") from :March
3,' 1970, till November 18, 1970, in a "managerial
capacity" at a salary of $200.00 per week. The Court
also found that the plaintiff David A. Johns was

crnploycd hy Tclcgift from February ::!8, 1 ~)70, until
X o\·e111her 18, 1!l70, at the same weekly salary. The
Court eo11cludcc1 that Tele gift Incorporated, which was
not a party defendant. owed the plaintiffs $G,500.00
plus an attomey fee of *l,;300.00 (R. 112).
The Court then fournl that Telegift Incorporated
h:ul been aequired h~· X atio11al (;ift Enterprises (hereinafter sornetimcs designated "National" or "National
( ~ift'') whieh, in tum, had heen acquired by Telegift
I 11 lerna tional. I IH'. (hereinafter sometimes designated
"K iahah" or ''Tclegi ft l ntenwtional"). The transadi1 JI JS "·c1·e dcsigna tee 1 as stoek for stPck rather than
stoek for asset aequisitions, the Court expressly finding
that "X o assets of Tclcgift Incorporated were acquired
by X ational" arnl that "X o assets of National were
aequirell" b~· 'felcgift International (R. 112). These
findings led the court to condmle that Telegift Inter·
national "di<l not assume" and was not obligated for
the indebtedness of Telegift .•Judgment was entered
against the plaintiffs ancl for the clefendants, no cause
of action.
From this .Judgment the plaintiffs appeal.

HELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Trial Court made findings concerning the pre·
<'isc amount of the plaintiffs' wage claims and attor·
ney's fees. Plaintiffs seek the reversal of the Judgment
entered on .June 1, 1972, and request that this Court
2

find, as a matter of law, that the respondent is obligated for the indebtedness of Telegift Incorporated to
the plaintiffs in those amounts previously specified in
the Trial Court's findings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
'Vayne l\1. Parker ancl David A . .Johns were hired
h)· Telegift I ncorporatecl on l\larch :J and February 28,
l !l70, respectively. Tele gift, as the name suggests, was
in the gift hy phone or wire business much like FTD
florists. The plaintiffs were hired in managerial capacities as national sales managers ( R. 184). l\Ir. Pm·k·~'·
was appointed Eastern Sales l\lanager and l\Ir .•Johns
was appointed 'Vestern Sales l\Ianager of the corporation ( H. 185). Both were hired for a base salary of
*:W0.00 per week plus expenses, plus an override for
business clone within their territory ( R. 157, 183, 184).
Both were introduced to clistrihutors of the company
as management functionaries ( R. 184). Both were
designatecl as management employees in correspondence
sent from Company headquarters ( R. 185). Each had
responsibilities consistent with management functions
including, hut not limited to, opening new sales areas,
j

hiring sales managers, training employees, directing
distributors, resolving disputes and handling a multitude
of other managerial problems (R. 184, 186). Both of
the plaintiffs made sales in the course of supervising
the hiring and training of Telegift's sales force. Neither
ever received an m·e1Tide or commission on any such
3

sale (H. 187) . .Xt.:ithcr Johns nor Parker eYer signed
an independent eo11tractors agreement although sales
personnel were always required to do so ( H. ~45, 24G).
Sometime shortly after the plaintiffs were first
t·n1ployec1, Telcgift became rnwhle to pay their salaries
when due. On se\·eral Ol'casions, plaintiffs receiver!
chcf'ks drawn nn ins11 f ficient f urnls ( ll. 18H) . In con.
siderntion of 11wir agreeing to remain on the job, \rith.
out regular pa~', plaintiff's were promis~cl that their
;.rnges woul<l he paid in full awl that they woulcl re1·eire
1-·tock options (IL 18!l, 1 no) . Payment was assured,
plaintiffs were aclYise<l, as soon as Tclegift merged
with one of se\·eral possible merger partners 1 whirh
would, in theory, proYide adequate working capital for
the corpora ti on ( R. 18!>- mo) . On the basis of such
representations, l\J r. Parker worked sixteen and one-half
weeks, intermittently, withont pay and .i\Ir. Johns
worked sixteen weeks ( H.. 17 4, 177. 189, mo).
On approximately ~ oyernher 18, 1970, the plain·
tiffs were jointly terminated. On February 8, H>71, a
Complaint was file<l against Telcgif't International, Inc.
by the plainti l'fs in the Thinl District Court for Salt
Lake ConHty (R. 1). The 'lefendant asserted in its
answer that it was not a proper party defendant to the
lawsuit arnl that plaintiffs' claim, if any, was against

IQne of such partners was, reportedly, Argus Camera. (See
testimony of Clarence L. Jolley, R. 221).

4

Tclegi ft I neorporated ( ll. 4). lt was also Yigorously
co11k11<lc<l at the time of trial that the plaintiffs were
not salariell employees of Telegift hut rather sales persmmcl hired on a commission basis (R. 227). It was
asserted that the money actually paid to the plaintiffs
was an advance on commissions ( R. 22!)), and that when
the plaintiffs were terminated they were obligated to
Telegi ft for amounts overdrawn ( R. 238, 239).
The Trial Court, in the face of the defendant's
representations which were "cliametrically opposed" (It.
258) to those of the plaintiffs, found that the plaintiffs
were not commissioned employees or independent contractors ( R. 258, 259).
The def cndant supported its argument that Telegift International was not obligated for Telegift's indebtedness by producing two separate Plans of Reorganization as Exhibits D-3 and D-4. The Exhibits
were introduced as proof that on August 24, 1970, National Gift Enterprises acquirecl all of the issued and
outstanding shares of Telegift Incorporated, and that
on October 16, 1970, Kiahab International Inc. (formerly Kiabah Uranium Corporation and later Telegift
International, Inc.) acquired all of the outstanding and
issued shares of National Gift Enterprises. These transactions were each characterized by the defendant as
1'tock for stock transactions resulting in the acquisition
of Telegift by Telegift International. The latter was,
allegedly, a holding company, the former its wholly
5

o\\'ncd s11hsidiarY (See defendant's

~le111orandum,

R

8:l).

Se\'eral months after Telcgift \nts acquired hy
Telegift lutcrnational. sc,·eral "inYestors" acquiretl
contrnl of Telegift International. The new "inYestors",
s11pposecllr operating as :111 unincorporated entity called
\\T eenig Enterprises ( H. -J.()). settled numerous claims
of creditors for a small peree11tage of their face value .
.. \lH~l nIRNT
POINT I
THE TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN TELEGIFT,
INCORPORATED, NATIONAL GIFT ENTERPRISES AND TELEGIFT INTERNATIONAL,
INC. WERE ILLUSORY. THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN FINDING THAT STOCK FOR
STOCK ACQUISITIONS BETWEEN CORPORATIONS DEALING AT ARMS-LENGTH ACTUALLY OCCURRED.

The issue hcfore the Court on this appeal is
whether O!' llot Telegift International is chargeable with
Tdcgi ft's obligations. The problem in resoking that
questillll is co111plicatcd hy a series of transactions i1wolri11g alleged!~, Sl'parate corporations. The legal theory
of the defendant is that in a stock for stock acquisition
the aeq11iring corporation is not liable for the acquired
corporation's indebtedness. Consequently, the defendant
asserts that X ational Gift Enterprises was not obligated
for the debts of Telegift Incorpoi:ated and that Tele6

gift I 11 tern a tio11al I ne. was not ohliga tecl for the debts
of either :\'" ational Gift Enterprises or Telegift Incorporated. Defendants argue that National Gift was
a subsidiary of Telegift International arnl that Telegift
was the subsidiary of National Gift.
'felegi ft Incorporated he fore its irwolvement with
the defendant or National Gift had good and bad featmes. The good features included the assets of the
corporation which were the product of much travel expense arnl leg work and which were simply not replaceable without substantial and costly duplication and effort. Those assets were "nine distributors covering
fifteen states, 8!) dealers, and approximately GOO dealer
applications awl inquiries for dealerships" (Exhibit
P-:!). They included the "Telegift system and trademark" which was, after the work that had heen done,
an asset of significant value to the success of the business ( R. 45, paragraph 2). The corporation, however,
also had, accorcling to its counsel, debts in the amount
of $1:33,817.00 at the time it was "acquired" by National
Gift (IL 7H).
The critieal problem concerned how to claim the
corporation's benefits and yet substantially avoid its
burdens. Stripped to the hare hones, the procedure used
was as follows. On August 24, 1970, National Gift
aecpiired all of the stock of Telegift Incorporated (R.
76). lVhen this transaction occurred Clarence L. Jolley
was the President of Telegift Incorporated, Max L.
7

Bmdick was Yicc Presidc11t and I )ennis Crimshaw was
Secrelary-Treasmer ( H. :Wt). Thomas H. Blo11q11ist
was its attornc\'
On Oetoher ]{),
. a11d resident au:enl.
''
I !li'O, a s<'ant three weeks latc1·, N '.ttional Ci ft and its
new suhsidiar~· was acquired hy Telegift lnternation:il
(then 1\.ialwb) a11 old urnnium corporation, whieh bad
been dormant for fourteen years but whose shares could
he p11hliel~· sold without further qualification with state
or t'edcral regulatory bodies. After this transaction
Tckgi ft I llternational was. until a surrender of eontrol
to the "i 11vestors" on December 20. I U7 0, several months
later. managed b~· its President, Clarenee L. .Jolley, its
\~ice PrPsidenl. :\I ax Burdi('k, ancl its Secretary-Treasmer. I>c1111is (~rimslww (IL :W4). Its legal affairs were
handled hy its attorne~· a11d re~ident agent Thomas R.
l~lonq11ist nncl the corporation operated under the s11hsta11tiall~· same name ancl from the same address as the
suhsidiar~· of its subsidiary, Telegift Incorporated. Dur·
i11g this period, each of the officers and directors
ostensibly operaled in a dual capacity for both Telegift
International. Im·. and Tele gift ln<'orporated. 2

From the time of the so-called acquisition, Telegift
International trealell, as will he later seen, both the
2fn a companion case presently pending before the Third
Court, !,arry Wilkins vs. Trl1 gift International, Inc ..
Civil No. 197927, the defendant .:1dmittcd that Messrs. Jolie)'.
Burdick, and Grimshaw abo became directors of National Gift
Enterprises during October of 1970, and that these three were
the only directors present at the last meeting of National Gift's
Board nn Dec:embcr 21, 1970. Mr. Blonquist was apparently also
the attorney for National Gift Enterprises (R. 217).
D1~trict

8

assets and creditors of Telegift as its mrn, controlling
the corpora tio11 's activities such as they were. 3 \\rith resped to creditors, however, the COJffcnient fiction of
!llllltiple corporations was rnaintainecl. \Vith cash alkgccll~' received from an investment group comprised
of the "investors", all of whom sat on Tclegift Internalional's Board of Directors, and with capital stock
of 'l'elegi ft I ntemational, the corporation induced 85
c·rcclitors to settle claims totalling $15,748.07 for
8.>,:WG.!l5 in cash and 18 creditors to settle claims of unknown value for 2;'59,73;3 shares of Tele gift International, I ne., the olcl uranium corporation's, capital
stock ( U. () 1-65) .
POINT II
TELEGIFT INTERNATIONAL INC. WAS l\"JT
A HOLDING COMPANY. THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT TELEGIFT INTERNATIONAL ACTIVELY ENGAGED
IN THE GIFT TRANSFER BUSINESS.
Defendant's counsel asserted numerous times in
argument that the clefendant was a holding company
a11cl that its only asset was the issued and outstanding
shares of National Gift Enterprises which in turn owned
Telegift (R. 7G, paragraph 6). A holding company is,
of course, a corporation created for the express purpose
3 The laf't meeting of Telegift's Board of Directors was in
December of 1970 (R. 48, 206, 207). The corporation was
suspended on September 15, 1971, for failing to pay franchise
taxes (R. 107).

9

of al'quiring and holding stock of other corporations. 8
Flcfl'licr, "Corporations" § 704().
The testi111011y of Clarence L . .Tolley, who sat at
counsel tahie with defense counsel during the trial, and
who sen·ed simultaneously as President of Telegift and
President of Telegift 111tcmational, Inc., did not support this analysis. II is testimony, as pertinent, was as
follows:

.:UR. 1\ LLH ED: "Xow. when you were sen·ing as President of both of those corporations, which were supposed to be separate
. . . what were the functions of Telegift,
l ne., aJl(l what were the functions of Telegift l 11tcrnatio11al, Inc.?"
::\IR. .T 0 L LEY: "Essentially they had the
sarne function."
(~.

"I 11 other words, they were both in the same
h11siness; is that corr~ct ?"

A.
the gift transfer business?"

(~.

"~leani11g

A.

''\Tes''.

Q.

"A11d there was 110 distinction, to your
knowledge, as to any diverse functions, as
between those two corporations?"

A.

"Xo". (R. 218, 219).

Althcnwh
~lr .•Tolley's
admisison should dispose
I:">
•
of the matter, there are se\•eral additional things which
10

s11ggt·st that the functions of Telcgi ft International
we11t far beyond those of a mere holding company.
The 11:u11e, 'l'clcgift International, Inc., itself,
arg·ues against the theory that the corpnratio11 is a holding compan~'· All of the good will of a gift by phone or
wire h11si11css such as Telegif't Incorporated, and all of
its prior cf forts and expense to geographically expand
and puhlici:.r,e its services, is tied up in the name. The
original name of Telcgift Intemational was Kiabah
Uranium Corporation (R. 22, paragraph 12). 'This was
s11hscq11entl~r changed Oil October 20, rn10, to Kiali~h
Jntcrna tional, Inc. Presumably, if Kiahab had been ;'t
holding company, the name change was intended to
i111pl~' that it was a holding company of international
dimensions. A much more plausible explanation, howe,·er, of this initial change is furnished by some consideration of the nature of the "gift by phone or wire
lmsiness". On N O\'emher 12, rn70, the name was
changed to Tck-gift International, Inc. (R. 22, paragraph 12). The final change was effected because the
name K iaha b International Inc. "did not describe the
acliritirs of the Corporation" (R. 48, paragraph 22).
The name Telegift did. l•-,or, as the Proxy Statement
sent to shareholders in connection with the transaction
he tween" Kiahab" and Tele gift indicated, "If the Shareholders ratify the acquisition of all of the outstanding
stoek of National, Kia bah 'Will be actively engaged in
the gift lm~incs.<; and the name KIABAB INTERN A·
'l' I 0 NA L, INC. would not describe the activities of
II

the Corporation" ( Ernphasis supplied) (Rxhibit P-2).
So, we arc told, the alleged "holding" company took the
name of a subsidiary of a subsidiary to describe lllore
appropriately its function.
The facts elicited duriug the course of the trial
clearly indicate that the defendant was not a holding
company hut that it was "aetiYely engaged" in the gift
transfer business using all of the resources but failin()'1'
to a!"s11111e the responsibilities of the subsidiary whose
name it bore. Telcgi ft International was merely a continuation of Telegift by Tdegift's own management
under a slightly a ltercd name.
POINT III
TELEGIFT INTERNATIONAL, INC. EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY ASSUMED THE INDEBTEDNESS OF TELEGIFT INCORPORATED.

Clarence J ,, .Jolley, the dominant figure in both
corporations, prior to the trial and in other proceedings
filecl .A ffidaYits ccmcerning the precise question of as·
sumption. Upon examination, .:\Ir .•Tolley a<lmitted that
certain AffidaYits in Support of .Motions for Summary
J udgmc11t in cases preYiously considered by the Third
District Court, were prepared by his then attorney, Ronald C. Barker, read by Jolley and signed in the presence
of a X otary Public. Ile indicated that the contents of
the AffidaYits represented the truth (R. 213).
Speaking as a past President of both corporations,

12

mid with the unique knowledge of one who supposedly
sl'tTecl in this dual capacity when the transactions relat-

ing to the accp1isition, or merger, or name change, as the
case may he, took place, l\lr. Jolley under oath asserted
that the "assets'' of Tclegift Inc. were "transferred" to
'J'clcgift International, Inc. and that Telegift International, Inc. "ruommcd and became liable for all of the
debts arnl obligations" of Telcgift Incorporated. 4
1\lthough the Affidavit was received in evidence
with some reservations ( H. 213), l\lr. Jolley admitted,
with some later hedging ( R. 215), that it was true (R.
213). The Court did receive the Affidavit in evidence
(H. 21:1, 214).

The assumption by Telegift International of Telegif t' s debts as expressly set out in the Jolley Affidavit
is strongly further referenced in correspondence from
the attomey, Thomas R. Blonquist, to the transfer company concerning the settlement of Telegift Incorporated
accounts with Telegif't International, Inc. stock (R. 61).
The letter reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
.June 30, 1971
Nelson Transfer Company
:rnn South Fifth East
Salt Lake City, Utah
4 Based on these Affidavits, the Third District Court in two
earlier decisions had held Telegift International, Inc. liable for
obligations of Telegift Incorporated. See: Mzirray State Bank vs.
Telegift Inc. et al, Civil No. 197329, Bank of Salt Lake vs. Telegift Inc. et al, Civil No. 197085.

13

He:

1'clcgift lntcn1atio11nl, Inc.

(; e11tlerne11:
"Over the past six months an investment group
has been working with the abm.·c referenced cor1wrat ion in an effort to solve its financial problems .
. . \s a result of the effort of the investment group,

nuu:y creditors of Telegift have agTee<l to settle

their claims against the corporation for investment stodc I 11 <:ach case the creditor has signer!
a sdtlement agreement and an investment undertaking.
In the hoard of directors meetiug held June 29,

l !l71, a resolution was passed authorizing the is-

suance of Tc legi ft I ntcrnationn l, I'nc. ea pita!
stock to those ercditors who have signed the heretofore referred to investnwnt undertakings. J\
cop~· of the minutes is enclosed herewith for your
file.
You are hereby instrude<l to issue shares of Tele·
gift ] 11ternati;mal, Inc. capital stock to the following persons or companies in the amounts
indicated . .All certificates are to be stamped with
the investment stamp arnl the restricted transfer
s t amp. "

(Then follows a list of the creditors of Tele gift
I ncorporate<l. Example: l\lalcolm C. Petrie, the
aceounbnt who prepared the Financial Statements which constitute :E-...::hibit "E." to defendant's .Answer to plaintiff's second set of Interroga tori cs, Il. ()(i) •
Concluding, Mr. Blonquist says:
"Thank you for your promptness m handling

14

Telcgift matters." (Emphasis supplied).
The to11e of the letter; its reference to the debts of

Te kgi ft I neorporated; its characterization of such debts

being those of Telegift International, Inc., strongly
suggests at the least an assumption of liability and at
the most the disregard of the fiction concerning the
separate identities of the two corporations.
as

Further proof of an assumption is found in the
Agreement of December 21, 1970, which is in evidence
as Exhibit P-2. In this document the Telegift International, Inc. "investors" who were, after the execution
of the Agreement its new officers and directors, charaderi:zed themselves as an investment group. Jolley,
Grimshaw, .Jackson and Burdick, who were, historically,
the officers of Telegift Inc., assigned their shares, resigned their positions and made other adjustments.

Note that Clarence Jolley, as "Director" (he was
in fact also President) of Telegift International. Inc.,
signed on the Defenclant's behalf and indicated as follows:
"It is agreed between Tele gift f "Telegift
I ntcrnational, Inc." - See Introductory Paragraph J and the investment group that the lat!er
shall have Carte Blanche authority to deal with
the creditors of Telegif't in such manner as they
see fit, including the issuance of capital sto~k t,o
them. if necessary, to satisfy the corporations
debts."
6.

15

~\gain. Tcleµ;ift l11tcrnatio11al, I111.·. µ;iYcs authority

lll;-

to settle its <lehts. "'hat those debts consisted of is
tllistakcahle. As )Jr . .Tolley testified, Tclcµ;ift Intcrnatio11:tl. I11e., the shell, prior to al'quiri11g Telegift lncorporatc<l had 110 debts other than the $n,ooo.oo for
actirntion expenses arnl the "historic:1l" indebtedness to
its ancient shareholders (ll. 210, 211). This was most
assure<l!y not the subject matter of the Agreement of
December 21, 1 H70, arnl the stock did in fact subsequently issue to ('!'editors of Teleµ;ift Incorporated (H. GI).
Tclcµ;ift I 11tcrnational. Inc. abo agreed to com·ey title
to the 1\.)()8 Cadillac automobile driYen hy Jolley hut
O\\'t1ccl h~· Tcleµ;i ft I 11corpora ted (Exhibit P-2). 5 Surely
the $10,000.00 setUement figure referred to in Exhibit
P-2 for Clarence .Tolley did not relate to obligations of
Teleµ;i ft I ntemational to him for the approximate 40day period during which he sen·ecl as its President after
the date 0 r the original transaction he tween the two
corporations arnl prior to his resignation on December
20, 1970. It also related to indebte<lness of Tele gift Incorpora tecl.
These facts support an assumption and the concept of "de facto" merger. The Third District Court.
5Note that Telegift International treated the Cadillac automobile as its own asset in direct contradiction to the statement
of counsel in the defen:;e memorandum that, "No evidence . , ·
wa,; produced to show that assets oi Telegift were transferre~ to
Kiabab" and directly contrary to the Trial Court's factual frnd·
ing-s that "No a::;sets of Telegift Incorporated were acquired by
National" and "No assets of National were acquired by D~
fenrlant. .. ". See also the testimony of Clarence Jolley on this
point (R. 211, 212).
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Judge Stewart l\I. IIaJ1Son presiding, found such an
assumption and joint and seYeral liability based on J ollcy's 1\ ffid~wit a!Hl the Plan of Heorganization (Exhibit P-4). The result of the Trial Court's ruling in the
instant ease was to put the Third District Court in the
position of m:iking Yarring awl ineo11sistent determinations on identical legal issues in companion cases. Sevend other cases presently pending will he determined
hy the <lceisio11 on this appeal. 6
Comts haYe been liberal in finding the "implied as.~umption" of liabilities arnl in determining under simifar
circumstances that the new corporation was "merely a
continuance of the old" Altoona v. Richardson Gas and
Oil Co. v. Commissioner 81 Kan. 717, 106 P. 1025,
Trrcst Te,rns Refining and Dct•elnznnent Company v.
Commissioner 08 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. l!lH3). The facts
arguing for such a conclusion here are compelling and
persuasiYc.
POINT IV
THE DEFENDANT, TELEGIFT INTERNA- ·
TIONAL, INC., CONTRARY TO THE FINDING
OF THE TRIAL COURT, ACQUJRED THE
ASSETS OF TELEGIFT INCORPORATED AND
WAS, ASSUMING A PROPER ACQUISITION,
SUBJECT TO RULES OF LAW PERTAINING
TO STOCK FOR ASSET ACQUISITIONS.
The effect of the transactions between the common
BLarry Wilkins vs. Telegift International, Inc., Civil No.
197927, Globe Travel Agency vs. Telegift International, Inc., Civil
No. 40522.
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dircl'lors and offi('ers of Tclegift and Tclcgift International was to place the assets of the former at the
llisposal of the latter. The Trial Court errecl in findinrrh
that the transactions between Telegift, National Gift
Enterprises aJl(l Telegift International were stock for
stock acquisitions.

It is apparent from the Affidm·it of Clarence L .
.Tolle~· in the earlier cases that "the assets of Telegift,
Inc. "·ere transferrecl to Telegift International, Inc."
(Exhibit P-2). The Affidavit and the testimony of
.Tolley constitutes the aclmission of the President of both
corporations that such a transfer actually took place. It
is apparent from the terms of the Agreement between
the investment group ancl Tclegift International that
the assets of Telcgift were treatecl as the assets of Telegift International (Exhibit P-5). Speaking of Exhibit
P-5, l\Ir. Jolley's testimony is enlightening with respect
to seYeral s peci fie assets.

l\IR. ALLRED: "Xow it [the Agreement,
P-;'51 also made mention of a
Caclillac automobile owned hy
you. Did you own a Cadillac
~n tomobil~ at that time?"

l\IR . .TOLLEY:

"~o,

I didn't."

Q.

"'Yl10 did own the Cadillac, HH>8 Cadillac?"

A.

"Te ]egi ft, I ne."

Q.

"Telegift, Inc., did, but this agreement with
'felegift International, Inc., made reference
to that vehicle, ancl said that you would be
permitted to retain it; is that correct?"
18

. I It • "
A. "'J'I la t', S ng

Q.

A.
Q.

"Y 011 signed that, [the Agreement] again,
on behalf of Telegift Iuternational, Inc.
giving authority to permit you to retain the
Cadillac; right?"
"\~es."

"And that was equally true of Mr. Charles
Jackson, who had a 196!) Cadillac of his
own. \Vho owned the Cadillac driven by Mr.
Jackson?"

A.

"~Ir.

Q.

"He owned it, in his own name?"

Jackson."

A. "Yes."
Q.

"\Vhat was the reason for including that as
a part of this contract and agreement?"

A.

" ... it was part of his compensation. Payments were made on his car as part of his
compensation."

Q.

"By Telegift, Inc.?"

A. "Yes".
Q. "Awl in this case, again, and I hate to repeat
the obvious, hut Telcgift International, Inc.,
said the automobile can belong to you, hereinafter."

A.

"Yes" (R. 211, 212).

At this time, when Telegift International the alleged holding company, which supposedly held and managed shares and nothing more, was disposing of
19

Tc legi ft' s assets an cl co11tracti11g with Tclcgi ft I nkrnatio11a l's Board as indi,,iduals for the settlement of Tclcgi f't' s debts. Tclcgi ft Inc. was a corporation without a
Board of Directors, whieh held no meetings during 1!)71.
(H. 107. H. 4<8, paragraph Hi). The admitted sale during rn71 of $rn,ooo.oo worth of Telegift assets (R. 48,
paragraph 21, H. 71) must he deeme1l to haYe been conducted, like the disposition of the Cadillac automobiles,
on authority of Tclegift International Inc.
If this Court concludes that the transaction between the corporations was a stock for asset acquisition
rather than a stock for stock acquisition, then the general
rule is as follows:
"Generally where 011c corporation sells or otherwise transfers all of its assets to another corporation, the latter is not liable for the debts and
liahilities of the transferor, except: ( l) where
the purchaser expressl~· or irnplie1ll~· agrees to
assume such debts. ( 2) where the transaction
amonnts to a consolidation or rncrµ;er of the corporation; ( :3) where the purchasi~1g- corporation
is merely a continuation of the selling corporation; and ( 4) where the transaction is entered
into fraudulently to escape liability for such
debts." Fletcher, PriYate Corporations section
712.
The numbered items in the ahoYe quotation were
acceptecl and treated as four separate exceptions, each
of which would stand on its individual merits, by the
"N" eYada Supreme Court in the case of Lamb v. LeRoy
20

Corporation 84 XeL~iG, 4;H P.2d 24. The p1ai11tiffs
contend, based on facts and circumstances recited here
and elsewhere in the Brief, that each of the four exceptions is applicab]e in the case before the Court.
Courts han• irwo1ved a number of theories to impose liability upon pmchasers of assets who use their
own stoek to finance the purchase, whether the shares
are delivered to the selling corporation or to its shareholders. Several of these theories which have application to these facts are hereinafter (liscussed. In the instant case, it is admitted that the Telegift International
shares were cleli,·ered directly to Telegift Incorporated
shareholders (R. 47, paragraph 13) .

.A.

Direct Delivery of Consideration for P1tr-

chasc to Shareholders.

The direct payment of purchaser's stock to selJer's
shareholders, lea\'ing the selling corporation without
assets to pay creditors, results in the imposition of liability upon the purchaser. 11lcKee v. Standard 11linerab1
CorJJ. 18 Del Ch 97, 1.36 A.ma. See also: Jennings
Scf'l and Co. v. Crystal Ice Co. 128 Tenn. 231, 159
S.\V. 1088. By deliberately bypassing the selling corporation, the purchaser places the seller in a position
in which it can not pay its creditors.
"The theory is that if stockholders of one cor21

poration turn <>HT it-; assets to anothl'r eorporatio11, rl'eciYing 1111to thl'mseh'es the stock of the
transfcrl'e i11 pay111l'11t. the tra11saetio11 is void a~
against creditori'i of the former. and thev rnav
look to the latter for satisfaction to the "cxter{t
of the ntl11e of the assets receiYe<l." ).llcKcc v.
Stal!dard Jli11crals Cor11., s111Jra at l 00-101.
"The courts are in unanimit\' upon the proposition that when a tra11saction of this sort takes
place it is a fraud on cre<litors ancl is void as to
them." 11/ cl\. cc v. Standard 11li11crals Cor11 ..
s 11 JJra at 10 I.
Telegift Incorporated after the transaction with
the Defendant theoretically experienced a net loss during rn71 of $a8,17U.OO (ll. 47, paragraph 11).
13.

JJc l 1'acto 11/cr~l:r

The "de facto" mercrcr
doctrine has also been int"!
n1ke<l to prntect creditor's rights in asset acquisitions.
The doctrine provides that a transaction in the fmm of
a sale of assets (or a stock acquisition) may, despite
efforts to give it another form, be treated as a merger.
See: 8 Cm·itcli, B 11sincss Or~a11i::atio11s at ()4, Ilarito11
v. Arco Electronics, Inc. 188 A.2d 123, Ilcilbrun v. Sun
Chemical Corp. as Del Ch 321, BO A.2d 755.
If treated as a merger, incidents characteristic to
statutory mergers apply. The most prominent of those
characteristics is the liability of the smTivor for the in·
debteclness of the merged corporation. The principle
of "de facto" merger was accepted and applied by this
22

suggest that the functions of Telegift International
went far beyond those of a mere holding company.
The name, Telegift l11ternatio11al. Inc., itself,
argues agai11st the theory that the corpnration is a holding compan~'· .All of the good will of a gift by phone or
wire h11si11css such as Telegift Incorporated, and all of
its prior efforts arnl expense to geographically expand
an cl pu hlici:.r,e its sen ices, is tied up in the name. The
origi11al name of Telegift Intemational was Kiabab
Uranium Corporation (R. 22, pamgraph 12). This was
subsequently changed on October 20, 1970, to Kiabab
International, Inc. Presumably, if Kiabab had been a
holding company, the name change was intended to
irnply that it was a holding company of international
dimensions. A much more plausible explanation, howeYer, of this initial change is furnished by some consideration of the natme of the "gift hy phone or wire
business". On N ovemher 12, 1!)70, the name was
eha11gcd to Telegift International, Inc. ( R. 22, paragraph 12). The final change was effected because the
name Kiabah International Inc. "did not describe the
act iz·ities of the Corporation" ( R. 48, paragraph 22).
The name Telegift clicl. For, as the Proxy Statement
sent to shareholders in connection with the transaction
between "Kiabah" and Telegift indicated, "If the Shareholders ratify the acquisition of all of the outstanding
stoek of National, Kia bah will be activel,ll engaged in
the gift business and the name KIABAB INTERN AT ION AL, INC. would not describe the activities of
11

the C'orporatio11" (Emphasis supplied) (Exhibit P-2).
So, we arc told, the :dleged ''holding" company took the
11nrne of' a s11bsidiar~· of' a subsidiary to describe lnore
appropriate!~· its function.
The fads eli<·itell dming the course of the trial
ekarl~· indicate that the defencla11t was not a holding
c·rn11p:111~· hut that it was "aetiYely engaged" in the gift
transfer business using all of the resources hut failing
to assume the responsihilitic..:s of the subsidiary whose
nallle it bore. Telcgift lt1ternatio11al was merely a continuation of Telegift by Telegift's own management
u11dn a slightly altered name.
POINT III
TELEGIFT INTERNATIONAL, INC. EXPRESSLY OR HvJPLIEDLY ASSUMED THE INDEBTEDNESS OF TELEGIFT INCORPORATED.

Clarcnee L . .J ollc~-, the domirnmt figure m Loth
corporations. prior lo the trial and in other proceedings
f i lcl l 1 \ l'f'ida ,.j ts eo11ecrning the precise question of ass11m ptio11. l rpon cxa11;inatio11, l\lr . .Tolley admitted that
certain .Affidavits in Support of l\Iotions for Summary
.Tudg111rnt in cases pn·yiously eonsidered hy the Third
District Court, were preparell hy his then attorney, Honald C. Harker. read h~· .Tolley and signed in the presence
of a Xotary Public. He inclicatecl that the contents of
the Affidavits represented the truth (R. 213).
Speaking as a past President
12

of both corporations,

Corporation 81" X ev.27(), 454 P.2d 21". The plaintiffs
co11te11d, based on fads and circumstances recited here

and elsewhere in the Brief, that each of the four exceptions is applicahle in the case hefore the Court.
Courts have inn>lved a number of theories to impose liability l1pon purchasers of assets who use their
own stock to finance the purchase, whether the shares
arc ddivere<l to the selling corporation or to its shareholders. Several of these theories which have application to tlwse facts are hereinafter discussed. In the instant case, it is admitted that the Telegift Internatio111~
shares were delivered directly to Telegift Incorporated
shareholders (H. 47, paragraph 13).

A. n,:rcct Deliver!/ of Consideration for Purchase to S harcholdcrs.
The direct payment of purchaser's stock to sel1er's
shareholders, lea\'ing the selling corporation without
assets to pay creditors, results in the imposition of liabilit~' upon the purchaser. 11lcKce v. Standard 11/ineral.Y
CorJJ. 18 Del Ch !l7, 156 A.193. See also: Jennings
Neff' and Co. v. Cr,ystal Ice Co. 128 Tenn. 231, 159
S.\V. 1088. By deliberately bypassing the selling corporation, the purchaser places the seller in a position
in which it can not pay its creditors.
"The theory is that if stockholders of one cor21

pora lion turn 0Yc1· its assets to a not her corporatio11, rceci,·ing unto thcrnsclYcs the stol'k of the
trans f ercc in pa~·mcnt. the transaction is Yo id as
against creditors of the former, alHl thev may
look to the latter for satisfaction to the 'extci;t
of the nduc of the assets receiYed." .1.llcKec \',
·"''tw1dard ,1/i11crols f'orp .. SllJJra at 100-101.
"The courts are in unanimity upon the proposition that when a transaction of this sort takes
place it is a fraud on cre(litors and is void as to
them." 1llcl\.cc v. Standard 1llinerals Corp.,
SlljJ/'(l at 101.
Telegift Incorporated after the transaction with
the Defendant theoretically experienced a net loss during 1!l71 of $a8,179.00 (R. 47, paragraph 11).

It

De Facto ill ergcr

The "de facto" merger doctrine has also been invokecl to protect creditor's rights in asset acquisitions.
The doctrine provides that a transaction in the fo11n of
a sale of assets (or a stock acquisition) may, despite
efforts to give it another form, be treated as a merger.
See: 8 Cr11·itcli. llusi11css Orgrwizations at G4, l-larito11
v. Arco ]t,'/cctro11ics, Inc. 188 A.2d 123. Ileilbrun v. Sun
Clic111ical CorzJ. :38 Del Ch :321, 150 A.2d 755.
If treated as a merger, incidents characteristic to
statutory mergers apply. The most prominent of those
characteristics is the liability of the sunivor for the in<lehtellness of the merged corporation. The principle
of "de facto" merger was accepted and applied by this
22

suggest that the functions of Telcgift International
went far beyond those of a mere holding company.
The name, Tele gift International, Inc., itself,
argues against the theory that the corp0ration is a holding company ..All of the good will of a gift by phone or
wire business such as Telcgift Incorporated, and all of
its prior efforts and expense to geographically expand
and publicize its services, is tied up in the name. The
orip;inal name of Telegift International was Kiabab
Uranium Corporation (R. 22, paragraph 12). This was
subsequently changed on October 20, 1970, to Kiabab
International, Inc. Presumably, if Kiahab had been a
holcling company, the name change was intended to
imply that it was a holding company of international
dimensions. A much more plausible explanation, hmve\·e1·, of this initial change is furnished by some consideration of the nature of the "gift by phone or wire
business". On November 12, 1970, the name was
ehangecl to Telegift International, Inc. (ll. 22, paragraph 12). The final change was effected because the
name Kiahab International Inc. "did not describe the
acti1·ities of the Corporation" ( R. 48, paragraph 22).
The name 'l'elegift <lid. 11""'or, as the Proxy Statement
sent to shareholclers in connection with the transaction
between" Kia bah" and Telegift indicated, "If the Shareholders ratify the acquisition of all of the outstanding
stol'k of National, Kia bah will be actively engaged in
the gift lmsiness and the name KIABAB INTERN A·
TlONAL, INC. would not describe the activities of
11

the Corporation" ( E111phasis supplied) (Exhibit P-~).
So, we a re told, the a llege<l "holding" com puny took the
1w111e of a subsidiary of a s1il>sidiary to describe 111ore
appropriate!~· its f11ndio11.
The facts elicite1l dmi11g the course of the trial
clcarl~· indicate that the defcwl:mt was not a holding
t'•H11pa11~· but that it was ''adi,·el~· engaged" i11 the gift
transfer business using all of the resources but failing
to assume the responsibilities of the subsidiary whose
tiame it ho re. Telegi ft I 11terna lional was merel~r a c011ti11uatio11 of Telegift by Telegift's own management
under a slightly altered name.
POINT III
TELECIFT INTERNATIONAL, INC. EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY ASSUMED THE INDEBTEDNESS OF TELEGIFT INCORPORATED.

Clarence L . .1 olle~', the dominant figure m both
corporations, prior to the trial and in other proceedings
filc<l Affidavits concerning the preeise question of assumption. tT pon examination, l\Ir . .Jolley admittecl that
certain Affidavits in Support of ":\lotions for Summary
.T udgment in cases pre\·iously considered hy the Third
Distrid Court, were prepare<l by his then attorney, Ro11ald C. Barker, reacl by Jolley and signed in the presence
of a ~ otary Public. Ile indicated that the contents of
the Affidavits represented the truth (R. 213).
Speaking as a past President of both corporations,
12

Corporation 84 Xev.27(), 454 P.2d 24. The plaintiffs

co11te11<l, hasecl on facts and circumstances recited here
and elsewhere in the Brief, that each of the four excep-

tions is applicable in the case before the Court.
Courts have involved a num her of theories to impose liability upo11 purchasers of assets who use their
0\\'11 stock to finance the purchase, whether the shares
are delivered to the selling corporation or to its shareholders. Several of these theories which have application to these facts arc hereinafter discussed. In the instant case, it is admitted that the Telegift International
shares were delivered directly to Telegift Incorporated
shareholders (R. 47, paragraph 13).
A. Direct Delivery of Con.Yidcration for Purchase to Shareholders.
The direct payment of purchaser's stock to seller's
shareholders, leaving the selling corporation without
assets to pay creditors, results in the imposition of liabilit>' upon the purchaser. 1llcKce v. Standard 1llinerals
Corp. 18 Del Ch !)7, 156 A.193. See also: Jennings
Xef'f and Co. v. Crystal Ice Co. 128 Tenn. 231, 159
S.\V. 1088. Ily deliberately bypassing the selling corporation, the purchaser places the seller in a position
in which it can not pay its creditors.
"The theory is that if stock11olders of one cor21

por;1tior1 turn oYer it'> assets lo another eorporatio11, reeci,·i11g unto thcrnseh·cs the slol'k of the
tra11sl'ercc in payment. the transadio11 is Y<>icl as
against creditors of lhc former. and thcv rnav
look to the latter for satisf'adion to the exte~t
of the Yalue of the assets receiYed." J.llcKcc v.
,'-,'frll!darrl Jfi11crals CorjJ., SlljJrrt at 100-101.
0

"The courts are in unanimity upon the proposition that when a transadion of this sort takes
place it is a fraud on creditors and is void as to
them." J.llc I\. cc Y. S ta11dard 11/i ncrals Corp.,
SllJJl'a at 101.
Telegi ft Incorporated after the transaction with
the I )efemlant theoretically experienced a net loss during rn71 of $:38,179.00 (H. 47, paragraph 11).

B.

De J!'acto i.ll erg er

The "de facto" merger doctrine has also been innikccl to proted t•reditor's rights in asset acquisitions.
The doctrine proYides that a transaction in the form of
a sale of assets (or a stock aequisition) may, despite
efforts to give it another form, he treated as a merger.
See: 8 Cr/'citcli, B11si11css Orga11i:::atio11s at (i4, Ilarito11
v. Arco ]<.,'lcctrouics, Inc. 188 A.2d 123. II cilbrun v. Sun
Chemical Corp. :38 Del Ch a:n. 150 A.2d 7.55.
If' treatecl as a merger, ineidents characteristic to
statutory mergers apply. The most prominent of those
characteristics is the liability of the smTivor for the indebtedness of the merged corporation. The principle
of "de facto" merger was accepted an,d applied by this
22

Court in the case of CoojJf'l' v. Utah Light and R,lj. Co.
:i.> ('tali ;)/0, 102 P. 202. 'J'he "de fado" merger doetrine was 111ore recently applied hy the Supreme Court
of ::\1 cw l\Icxico in A 111crica11 llos11ital and Life Insurr111tc Co. •·. Ku 11/"d 71 N .l\l. 1G4, ;17() P.2cl 956. See
also: 15 Fletcher, "Corporations", section 7127, p. 207,
and rnmierous cases there cited, Allen D. Choka, "Buying, Selling and .Merging Businesses," American Law
Institute-American Bar Association Publication, at
pages 115 and 11 n.

PRIOR UTAH DECISIONS
~

Problems similar to those raised on this appeal seem
to haYe been infrequently eonsidered hy the Court. The
<le('isions, though ancient, appear, howeYer, to be in line
with the predominant authority expressed m more recent opinions from other jurisdictions.
In the Utah case of Cooper v. Utah Light and Ry.
Co. B.> Utah 570, 102 Pac.202, the plaintiff had a tort
claim. JI is injury occurred on January 2, 1903, on property used by the Utah Light and Power Company.
Plaintiff recm·ered judgment against Utah Light and
Power on January 24, 1907. In the meantime, on about
January 2, rno4, Utah Light awl Power transferred its
prnperty to Utah I ,ight and Railway Company. The
sole consideration for the transfer was 3,062,500 shares
of Utah Light and Hailway stock distributed directly
to Utah Light and Power's stockholders on a share for
share exchange. The purchase agreement provided that
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TTtah 1 ,ight a11cl Po\\'er "should he sold awl tra11sferre<l
to" l 1tah Light atHl Hailway. Utah Light and Hailway
elaimcd ownership of the assets. After the transaction,
as in the instant case, officers of the purchased corporation scrvc<l in identical positions with the purchaser. Utah
1,ight awl Hailwa~·, like Telcgift International, hacl
knowlc<lge of the creditor's claim. The trial court awarded the creditor judgment against Utah Light ancl llailway which appealed alleging that there was not a consolidation hut a sale; awl that Utah Light and Power,
among other things, cli<l not cmwey its franchise to he a
eorporation [i.e. it had a separate existence].
The Court acknowleclgccl that "a separate and disti11ct" corporation which has succeeded by a "valid" pmehase and transfer to the property and rights of another
eorporation was not liable by reason of its succession
unless it affirmatively appears that the transfer "in
fact or in l~nr" constitutes a fraud upon creditors or
unless ''the circumstances attending the creation of tlic
ll<"ZCJ corporation, awl its succession of the property and
franchises of the old corporation, are such as to warrant
a finding that it is in reality a mere co11ti11uation of the
old corporation." (Emphasis supplied).
The Court found that. normally speaking, a corporation could sell part or all of its property. But it is
"clear", said the court, that it cannot sell, or otherwise
dispose of its property to the prejudice of its creditors
any more than an indiYidual may sell or gispose of his
24

property to the prejudice or injury of his creditors. The
Court founcl that the only consideration for the purchase
of Utah J ,ight arnl Power was capital stock of Utah
Light and Hailway. It stated,
"It may he that a creditor cannot complain when
the shares of stock of the purchasing corporation are reeeived and held hy the selling corporation as assets and property of the latter
eorporation, except on the ground that the consideration was not valu'.thle nor adequate, upon
the same grournl that he might complain of any
other consideration . . . l~ut we think he may
very properly complain when the selling corporation and the vender enter into an agreement
or arrangement whereby all the property of the
selli11g corporation is to be conve~·ed and transferred upon a consideration, whether cash, shares
of stock. or other property, which is not to he
paid aIHl receiwd as assets and property of the
selling corporation, but which is to he distributed
among its stockhoiders, and the property is so
sold and the proceeds of sale so distributed."
The distinction between the Cooper case and the
Tclegift situation, if there is any substantial difference,
centers arouncl the treatment of the assets. In the Cooper
case the assets were expressly conveyed to Utah Light
and Railway. In other words, in the Cooper case, Utah
Light and Power gave everything it had "except the
franchise to be a corporation", and its tort claims and
other indebtedness. In the Telegift situation the stock
for stock exchange was carried out in an identical manner, although it was a five share for one share exchange,
25

\\'ith the cxccpli<'ll that the assets were not c,l'JJrcssl,1; convc~·cd. They were simpl~· treated as if they were the
assets of Telcgif't International, Inc. and there was, according· to the President of both corporations, an "arwhcreh,·•
ran t"""I0·cn1e11t" .....rto use the Coo11cr terminolocry]
M..
the "assets" were in fact "transferred" 11otwithstandi11"'t"I
the form the transaction took for other purposes.
The Court co11cl11<1cd that the transaction between
Utah Light and Power and Utah Light and Hailway
was, as to creditor, "not only fraudulent, but 1mlawful."
The Court said,
"\V c can coneciYe of 110 arrangement which wo11lil
more cffeduall~· place all the property of a corporation beyond the reach of the general creditors, and which would be more to their prejudice.
The selling <'orporation in sueh case is for all
purposes. outside of the winding up of its affairs, defunet, and in the condition of a dissolved
corpora ti011. '' 7
This Court accepted the "de facto" merger doctrine acknowledging that there are cases where the
transfer is "practically a consolidation."
In deciding for the creditors, the Court concluded
that among the circumstances to be considered were the
following, each of \\'hich has equally strong or stronger
parallels in the present case.
7Telegift Incorporated was suspended by the Utah Secretary
of State for non-payment of franchise 'taxes on September 15,
1971, (R. 107).
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The pmchasing coporation took the property
awl franchises of the seller "and continued to prosecute
the f)lt.'ii11css of the selling corporation ... " (Emphasis
supplied).
1.

"Some" of the principal officers of the selling
corporation continued to serve in the same capacities
for the purchasing corporation.
2.

Aside from the issue of fraud, the court finally
concluded, that
" ... the transaction, as found, was, according to
the authorities heretofore cited, so far as effr 1 ·~
ing the rights of creditors, like that of a consolidation or a continuing corporation, rendering the
purch'.1sing- company liable in equity for the debts
ancl Jiahilities of the selling corporation."
The case has been approvingly cited on a number
of occasions. See particularly, 11oggan v. Price River
lrri!fofio11 Co111)HllllJ l84<

P.

5:36.

POINT V
TELEGIFT INTERNATIONAL, INC. WAS, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, LIABLE FOR
THE OBLIGATIONS OF TELEGIFT INCORPORATED EVEN IF THERE HAD BEEN, AS
THE DEFENDANT ALLEGED, A PURELY
STOCK FOR STOCK TRANSACTION BETWEEN TWO SEPARATE CORPORATIONS.

A. Rules of Law Governing a Stoel£ for Stock
Acquisition.
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If one assu111cs, arg11e11c10, as Defendant allege~.
that the transadion between Tclegift and Tclegift Internatio11al was a stock for stock acquisitio11, and that
Tclcgil't International was a "holding" compan~·, the
general rnlc is as follows:
"...:\ holding compan~· is not liable f'or the
torts, dchls and obligations of its subsidiary, 1111less it uses its stock O\\'tJership in such a rnanner
as aduall.\· to contrnl and operate the properties
of its sl!hsidiar~·." L) Fletcher, "Corporations",
scetion 71:n p. 217. Sec: ,l/arti11 '" Dcn·lo1n111'11f

Co. of' A 111crica 240 F. 42, Ros.~ '" 1'c.rnR Co. (i8
A.2<1 a:!I, Costa/I Y. ,lJrwila ]~'lee. Co. 2-1< F.2d
:rn:~, Bcrkc,11 Y. Third ~ fre1111c ll,11. Co. 244< X. Y.
H02, 15,3 X. E. !)14. Jlorougli of A mbridgc r.
Pliilwlcl1il1ia Co. 28:3 Pa.5, 12D

~\.G7.

The reason for the stock for stock rule is generally
u11clerstandahle. Under the rule, the purchasing corporation assumes the risk that the acquired corporation has
debts whieh were unknown or undisclosed at the time of
the p11 rchase. \ Vhi le the purchaser does not onlinarily
hecolllc personally liable for these debts, the existc11ee
of such clehts may rcduee the Yalue of the purchaser's
im·estme11t by reclucing the net worth of the eorporation
whose shares arc acquired. 8 Cm·itch. B usincss Orga11i::;afio11s, section HW.01 ( 1), p. 372. The theory runs that
the purchaser's price will he exeessiYe if the corporation
whose stoek it has purchased has unknown or undisclosed
indehtetlness. 8 Ca1_ itch, BusincNs Organizations, section
1()1.02 (1), p. 57.
1
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l mplicit in the foregoing, arnl in the general rule
reeite(l a hove, are the following presumptions:
The transaction must he an arms-length transaction between two separate ancl distinct corporate
entities.
1.

2. The purchaser must give value for the shares
of the corporation which is acquired. See: Cooper v.
Utah Light and Ry. r'o. 35 Utah .570, 102 P. 101, TfT est

Tuas Rc/'i11i11g and Dt"L'elopment Co. v. Commissioner

G8 F.2cl 77 (10th Cir.)

a.

The acquirecl corporation, or subsidiary, must
he operated in such a manner as to constitute more than
a mere instmmentality of the purchaser, under the purchaser's domination and control.
In the instant case, the reasons for the application
of the general rule disappear. Telegift International,
the purchasing corporation, had no assets, gave no value
all(l ran no risk that its investment would he damaged
b~· this indebtedness of Tclegift. Telegift International
ha(l liabilities for expenses to reactivate the corporation
in the amount of $9,000.00 and a "historical deficit"
of $140,000.00. The corporation had been an inactive
arnl dormant shell for approximately fourteen years.
(Sec: Unaudited Financial Statement attached to page
3 of the Proxy Statement, Exhibit P-2). National Gift
Enterprises Inc. and Telegift Incorporated, converse!~.; had, accepting defendant's figures, (which are
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quest io11a hlc) for l he 11ine-rno11l h period ending September 30, rniO. allege<l net income of ~lH.),8.31.58. (See:
Finaneial Statements, Exhibit P-~).
111 other words, Telegi ft I 11ternalional (then Kiahab) the shell, acquired for the exchange of its rnl11eless shares what appeare<l to be a going organization
with substantial assets, an operating history, an organization an<l profits. Telegif't lncorporatecl's shareholders,
who eontrolled !)7% of Telcgift International's shares
a ft er the merger, recei,·e<l really nothing in consideration
of smTe11<kring their interest in Telegift, not eYen new
1nanageme11t.
The alleged acquisition, in its inception, was effecte<l to permit the public sale of the surYiYing shell's
stock "·ithout further registration with the Securities
awl Exchange Commission. It hacl incidental and sec011<1ary benefits with respect to the numerous and press- ,
i11g claims of creditors. The two corporations were. for
all intents arnl purposes. merged although the fiction
of separate identity was retained for conYenience anJ
len·ra()'e in dealin(l' with creditors. The claims of the
~

~

appellants were not unknown to Telegift International
and Telegift Incorporated's dual management. Telegift
International ga Ye nothing of Yalue for the shares of
Teleuift
Incor1Jorated.
/'."

B.

Control Cunsiderations. A 11alysis of E.rceptio11
to General Huie.
30

"'hilc stock ownership alone does not render the
~tockholding company responsible for the torts, debts
and obligations of the subsidiary company, still if the
holding company uses its stock ownership in such manner as actually to control and operate the properties of
its subsidiary, it does become responsible. See: Roo,y v.
1'c.1'aR Co. G8 F.2cl 321; Costan v . .Jlanila Elec. Co. 24
F.:!cl :J83; Berkey v. 1'hird Avenue Ry. Co. 244 N.Y.
(iO'.Z, 15.i

X.E. Ul4.

1Vhcrc stock control is resorted to not for the purpose of participating in the affairs of the corporation
in the normal and usual manner, but for the purpose of
co11trolli11g the co1111Hmy so that it may be used as a mere
i11str11111c11tality of' the orcning companlJ courts u:ill look
through the screen of separate control and place the resp011sibility where it actually belongs. (Emphasis supplied) Radio Craft Co., Inc. v. TVestinglwuse Elec. and
Ma1111f act11ring Co. 7 F.2d 432.
Consider the extent of the Defenrlant's control and
operation of its alleged subsidiary, Telegift lncorporatecl:
After their dealings in October of 1970, and
prior to December 20, rn70, Telegift and Telegift International had the same Presiclent, the same Vice President, the same Secretary-Treasurer, the same Attorney
and the same Resident Agent (R. 21, paragraph 6, R.
:!5, paragraphs 37, 38, J alley testimony R. 202-206,
1.

216, 217).
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Both of tile eorporalions arc located at the
same address, a:rn South Third East in Salt Lake Citr
.'
( Ttah ( H. ~-i, paragraphs :J:!, :rn).
:!.

The only meeting of the Hoard of Directors
of Tclegift Incorporated after the alleged acquisition
was attended by all of the Directors of Telegift International. the "investors", ineluding l\Iessrs. Boyd, Rurdiek, \Vee11ig and Haynie, and the attorney, Thomas R.
Blonquist ( H. -J.8, paragraph IG).
:J.

Telcgift Incorporated does not have a functioning Hoard of Directors, nor officers, and has had
none since December of rn70 ( R. :!2, paragraph H, R.
47, paragraphs 14 and 15).
4.

;). Telegift Incorporated has not had a Ifoard
l\I ceting since Decern her :n. 1970, and has' not had an
annual meeting since the alleged acquisition (R. 48,
paragraphs rn and 17).
H.

Telegift Incorporatc<l is a suspended corpora-

tion and has been since September 15, 1971 ( R. 107).
7.

Telcgift International Inc. has taken the name

of its alleged subsidiary and is, or has been, engaged in
the husincss of transmitting gifts by phone or wire, the
same business eonductecl by Telegift Incorporated prior
to the dealings between the two corporations ( R. 2.5,
paragraph 39, R. 218, 219).
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Tclcgi ft Incorporated 's debts were compromised by Tclcgift International, Inc.'s "investors" after
consent, not by Telegift Incorporated's Board, (it had
none) but rather by Telegift International, Inc. through
its President, Clarence L. Jolley (Exhibit P-2, R. 2078.

212).

The imlebtedness of Telegift Incorporated was
compromisc<l with cash furnls contributed by Hany l\I.
WeC'nig, Dean A. Riddle, Frank E. Boyd, Max J,,
Bmdiek nnd Louis 1\1. Haynie, all directors of Telegift
lnternational Inc., and, in part by the issuance of the
capital stock of Telegift Intemational, Inc. (R. ,f:-i,
paragraph G).
!I.

Assets of Telegift Incorporated in the amount
of *rn,150.30 were sold during the year 1971, while
Telegift I,1corporated was without a Board of Directors (IL 48, paragraph 21, Schedule "F").
10.

Such assets were sold without Board approval and

in viola tio11 of the rights of cre<li tors.

Summarizing, the law provides that if one corporation is wholly under the control of another, the fact that
it is a separate entity does not relieve the latter from
liability for its acts, and even when one corporation is
the owner of another, the latter will be regarded as n
mere trade name, and the real beneficiary cannot resort
to the fiction of claiming in the name of the latter to
83

defeat bona ficlc creditors.
8 F.:!d

[11

re 1llarcclla Cotton Mills

;'):!~.

lf by stock ownership, common officers and the
relation of debtor and ere<litor (all of which arc factors
in the instant case) 8 , or otherwise, a subsidiary corporation hccomes a mere agency or department of the holding company, or is used as a blind or instrumentality to
perpetuate fraud, the holding company earmot escape
liahilitv
for the acts of its subsidiary.
Owl ]1'umit!afi11lJ
•
•
"
l'l
Corp. v. Calij'ornia <'wwidc Co., Inc., 24 F.2d 718.

If these rnles clid not apply, and if there were no
exception to the general rn1c, then all that counsel would
h:tYe to do in order to aYoi<l the claims of creditors would
be to characterize a merger, or a stock for asset transaction, as a stock for stock acquisition. In the case before the court, there was no vali<l business purpose for
acquiring a subsidiary and letting it die from disuse, or
for a putative parent to he actively involved in the same
business as its subsi<lary and namesake.

CONCLUSION
The defendant "acquired" Telegift through a series
of self-dealing manipulations involving interlocking
directorates, common officers and conflicts of interest.
BCounsel for the defendant argued that defendant's stock
was used to settle Telegift Incorporated's debts. The consideration for such a transaction was alleged to be the settlement of the
indebtedness of a wholly owned subsidiary. It was alleged that
the settlements ('reated obligations running from Telegift In·
corporated to Telegift International.
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lf it is di fficnlt to more accurately describe what
actually occ11rrcd, it is because the confusion engendered
hr two separate acquisitions in 23 clays, changing nothing but the 11iarketahility of the surviving corporation's
shares, defies more precise analysis. Under the factual
circumstances, howeYer, it little matters whether the
dealings hetween the corporations inYolved a merger, a
stock for asset or a stock for stock acquisition. In each
case the law is adequately designed to avoid injustice
through the unfair treatment of creditors.

The involYement of the "investors" some two
months after the last "acquisition" had occurred in no
way altered those rights which had then vested and is of
little consequence to these deliberations. The facts with
which this appeal is concerned were pre-cast and inherited by Telegift International's present principals
who, at the very least, have used the "acquisitions" adrnntageously.
The defendant's argument that Telegift was a mere
subsidiary of Telegift International, a holding company
which was not involved in the gift business, was as inaccurate as its argument that the plaintiffs were unsalariecl arnl commissioned employees.
The degree of control exercised by Telegift International, the common officers, directors and names of
the two corporations, the brief time which elapsed between the "acquisitions" and the disregard of corporate
formalities, all compellingly argue that the transaction
35

was ilh1sor~· and that the slll'\'1v111g corporation was a
mere eo11ti1111ation of its predecessor, or, at the Yery
least, in complete control of its predecessor's affairs.
This Court is not obliged to accept the defe11dant's
eharaetcrization that this was a stock for stock acquisition beeause the defenda11t claimed it was before the
Internal Hevcnue Service (Exhibits D-3, D-4) .9 The
s11 bstanee. rather than the form the transaction took,
govenis.
The Trial Court made factual findings contrary to
the express and uncontradicted admissions of the President of both corpnrations and inconsistent with prior
determinations of the Thinl District Court. (See Argument, this Brief, Point IV). The Tri'll Conrt Prrecl,
notwithstanding such findings, in applying the law to
the faets it found.
The decision of the Trial Court should he reversed.
The Court's dollar findings pertaining to the appellants'
lo!-.s should be assessed against Telegift International,
Inc.
Hespectf ully submitted,

.JOEL ~I. ALLRED
610 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for A ppcllant.~
9 An v more than the
Internal Revenue S e r vi c e was
cbliged to tax a medical partnership as a partnership rather ~han
as a corporation in a state where corporations were not permitted
to pr<>.ctice medicine. See the famous Pelton case. Pelton v. Com·
mis.~ioncl' 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936),
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